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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
         
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 11-4234 
_______________ 
 
JAMES T. MOORE, 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ERIC K. SHINSEKE, SECRETARY OF THE UNITED 
STATES DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN AFFAIRS 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-10-cv-04463) 
District Judge: Hon. Mary A. McLaughlin 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 8, 2012 
 
BEFORE: SCIRICA, GREENAWAY, JR. and COWEN,  
 
Circuit Judges 
(Filed: July 3, 2012) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge
  
. 
 Plaintiff, an African-American male, alleges that defendant retaliated against him 
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for making a complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and 
discriminated against him on the basis of his race and gender in violation of  Title VII, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e. The District Court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment 
and dismissed plaintiff’s claims. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo and 
apply the same standard as the district court. Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 
2004). Under that standard, we conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact 
and will affirm the District Court’s judgment. Id.  
 (A) Plaintiff alleges that defendant issued a notice of proposed removal 
(“removal notice”), which was later reduced to a 14-day suspension, in retaliation for 
plaintiff’s EEOC complaint regarding defendant’s investigation and personnel action 
relating to sexual harassment allegations against plaintiff.  To establish a claim of 
retaliation in violation of Title VII, plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he engaged in 
protected activity, (2) defendant took an adverse employment action against him, and (3) 
there was a causal connection between the adverse action and protected activity. Nelson v. 
Upsala Coll., 51 F.3d 383, 386 (3d Cir. 1995). The parties dispute only whether there was 
a causal connection between plaintiff’s EEOC complaint and the defendant’s issuance of 
the removal notice.  
Plaintiff relies on the temporal proximity between his informal EEOC complaint, 
made on April 9, 2008, and the issuance of the removal notice on June 24, 2008 to 
establish a prima facie case of causation. “‘[T]emporal proximity between the protected 
activity and the [adverse action] [can be itself] sufficient to establish a causal link.’” 
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Williams v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 760 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(citations omitted). However, “where ‘the temporal proximity is not so close as to be 
unduly suggestive,’ we have recognized that ‘timing plus other evidence may be an 
appropriate test . . . .’” Thomas v. Town of Hammonton, 351 F.3d 108, 114 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(quoting Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 513 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). Here, the protected activity is plaintiff’s complaint to the EEOC, not the 
EEOC’s dismissal of the complaint, as urged by plaintiff. Drawing all reasonable 
inferences in favor of plaintiff, defendant was not aware of the EEOC complaint until 
April 29, 2008, almost two months before the removal notice was issued. Two months is 
not so close to be unduly suggestive of causation. Williams, 380 F.3d  at 760.  There is no 
additional evidence suggesting that defendant issued the removal notice because of 
plaintiff’s EEOC complaint. Accordingly, there is no basis from which to infer a causal 
link. Plaintiff’s retaliation claim was properly dismissed by the District Court.  
(B) Plaintiff also alleges that the proposed removal and 14-day suspension were 
motivated by plaintiff’s race and gender and, therefore, discriminatory in violation of 
Title VII. For a claim of race or gender discrimination, plaintiff must establish a prima 
facie case by demonstrating (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he is qualified for 
the job, (3) defendant took an adverse employment action, and (4) the circumstances 
surrounding the adverse action support an inference of discrimination based on the 
plaintiff’s protected class. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 
(1981). The parties dispute only whether the circumstances give rise to an inference of 
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discrimination.  
Plaintiff relies on comparator evidence to establish an inference of discrimination. 
Whether a comparator is truly similarly-situated to the plaintiff is an issue of law. See, 
e.g., Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 645-46 (3d Cir. 1998). 
Here, the comparators are not similarly-situated to plaintiff because of their positions 
held, the comparators’ conduct that was the subject of the investigation and who it 
targeted, their willingness to cooperate in the investigation, and whether the allegations 
were substantiated. As a result, the defendant’s treatment of them, even if more favorable 
than that of plaintiff, does not support an inference of discrimination. Plaintiff’s argument 
highlights no other evidence from which to draw an inference of discrimination; 
therefore, plaintiff’s claims for race and gender discrimination were properly dismissed.  
(C) Even assuming plaintiff established a prima facie case for any of these 
claims, plaintiff has not come forward with evidence that defendant’s proffered non-
discriminatory reason—that allegations of sexual harassment against plaintiff were 
substantiated and the action taken was disciplinary—are pretextual. McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Even if defendant had been mistaken in relying on 
the investigation of the allegations against plaintiff, that mistake is not sufficient to 
“disbelieve the employer’s articulated reasons.” Fuentes v. Perksie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d 
Cir. 1994). Likewise, there is no evidence from which to infer that a “discriminatory 
reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s 
action,” particularly considering the paucity of evidence supporting an inference of 
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discrimination in the first instance. Id. As a result, plaintiff’s claims were properly 
dismissed on this basis as well.  
The judgment of the district court entered on October 25, 2011 is affirmed.  
